Choosing a DNS resolver, and why the upstream matters
DNS is the one service that sees every site you visit. Picking a resolver is a privacy decision, a security decision, and — done wrong — a silent downgrade.
Every connection your machine makes starts with a DNS lookup. That makes your resolver the one service with a complete list of everywhere you go — and a useful place to block things before a connection is ever attempted.
It is also somewhere people configure once, write down what they chose, and never verify.
The security case
A filtering resolver refuses to answer for domains known to host malware, phishing kits and command-and-control infrastructure. The lookup fails and the connection never happens.
This catches things endpoint protection misses, because it acts earlier and does not require the payload to reach the machine. It is not a replacement for endpoint security — it is a cheap layer in front of it.
Quad9 (9.9.9.9) blocks malicious domains and validates DNSSEC, and is operated by a Swiss non-profit with a no-logging policy. Cloudflare (1.1.1.1) is fast and privacy-focused but does not filter by default. Google (8.8.8.8) is reliable and filters nothing.
The variant trap
This is the detail that catches people, and it caught us on our own network.
Quad9 runs several services on different addresses:
9.9.9.9/dns.quad9.net— secured: malware blocking plus DNSSEC validation9.9.9.10/dns10.quad9.net— unsecured: no blocking, no DNSSEC9.9.9.11— secured plus EDNS Client Subnet
The .10 addresses exist for people who explicitly want no filtering. They are one character away from the secured ones, and they look identical in a configuration file at a glance.
We audited a resolver that had been configured with Quad9 for months — and found it pointing at dns10. All of Quad9's plumbing, none of its protection. The configuration looked right. It was not.
Check which one you are actually using, not which one you meant to.
Encrypt the queries
Plain DNS is unencrypted and unauthenticated. Your ISP sees every domain you look up, and on a hostile network the answers can be tampered with.
DNS-over-HTTPS or DNS-over-TLS fixes both:
- DoH:
https://dns.quad9.net/dns-query - DoT:
tls://dns.quad9.net
If you configure an encrypted upstream by hostname, you also need bootstrap servers — plain IP addresses used to resolve the hostname of the encrypted resolver itself. Set those to the same provider's IPs, and make sure they are the secured ones.
Verify from the client
The reliable test is to ask what your resolver looks like from the outside:
Resolve-DnsName whoami.akamai.net -Server 192.168.1.2 -Type A
The address returned is the egress IP of whatever resolver actually answered. If you configured Quad9 and that address belongs to someone else, something upstream is overriding you — or you are load-balancing across providers without realising.
Confirm DNSSEC validation is genuinely on by asking for a domain with a deliberately broken signature. dnssec-failed.org must fail to resolve. If it returns an address, nothing is validating.
One caveat on redundancy
If you point everything at a single provider, an outage at that provider takes your name resolution with it. Most resolvers let you configure a fallback.
Be deliberate about it, though. Load-balancing across two providers means roughly half your queries bypass the filtering of the other — and you get the security properties of the weaker one, half the time. A primary with a genuine fallback is usually better than two equals.